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Benedict Kingsbury*
Claims by Non-State Groups
in International Law
I. Objectives and Structure of this Article
The capacity of international society' to deal with the challenges posed
by the claims of non-state groups2 is a matter of pressing concern. The
adequacy of existing international structures is highly questionable.
Fundamental conflicts exist between values of justice and the hitherto
dominant values of order. While many of the issues are not primarily
legal, public international law is necessarily involved. This article exam-
ines the norms developed in the international legal system to address
issues arising in relations between states and non-state groups. This
article argues that in international political debates, and in much (but by
no means all) of the principal legal material, three distinct general
domains of discourse have been employed to express and address claims
by non-state groups.3 The separate structure of each of these domains
has obscured the overlap (if not the identity) of underlying justificatory
purposes among these different domains.
Certain fundamental problems in the application of international
legal norms to relations between states and non-state groups might be
* University Lecturer in Law, Oxford University; Visiting Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School (Fall 1991); Visiting Professor of Law, Duke Law School. The
author would like to thank Don Horowitz and Lisa Pirozzolo for comments, and the
Cornell International Law Journal for the kind invitation to present this preliminary
study for a larger work at the 25th anniversary symposium.
1. Hedley Bull's definition of a society of states, modified to include a wider
range of actors, suggests that an international society exists where a group of actors,
"conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions." HED-
LEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SociETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13
(1977).
2. The term "non-state groups" is used here in a non-technical way to denote
encompassing groups important to the identity of individual members in which indi-
vidual membership, while not necessarily resting on ascriptive identity, is not simply
a matter of readily-reversed voluntary choice. It thus includes, but is not limited to,
ethnic groups. The existence or absence of formal legal personality for the group
under municipal or international law is not directly material.
3. The three general domains of discourse are: claims to self-determination,
minority rights claims, and human rights claims. See infra text accompanying note 4.
25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 481 (1992)
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avoided by focusing attention on the commonality ofjustificatory pur-
pose. In particular, such a unified analysis would help in resolving some
of the problems of commensurability or reconciliation where the differ-
ent domains appear to conflict, and ought to open the way to better
balancing of competing rights and interests. More generally, this article
argues that the international community has not done enough to
develop either the normative framework, or the systems of monitoring
and enforcement necessary to make the norms effective. The result is
that in relations between states and non-state groups there is often no
consensus among parties or non-parties concerning the nature or appli-
cation of relevant norms. The response of the international community
to particular conflicts or crises has often been ad hoc rather than a
straightforward and predictable application of clear rules. Such a
response diminishes the authority and effectiveness of international
community action when it is finally attempted.
Many areas of international law, including state succession, state
responsibility, the law of treaties, the law relating to title to territory,
recognition, and the law of international organizations, are relevant to
the legal analysis of claims by non-state groups. However, claims by
non-state groups are characteristically expressed at the international
level in five principal domains of discourse. Three of these are general:
claims to self-determination; minority rights claims; and human rights
claims, including those relying on principles of equality or non-discrimi-
nation.4 The other two, while important, by their nature have value only
in a more limited and specialized range of circumstances. These are
claims to sovereignty legitimized by historical arguments or other spe-
cial circumstances, and claims to special rights by virtue of prior
occupation.
Each of these five domains of discourse has its own bounded struc-
ture of legitimacy and justification, and thus shapes claims and
responses made within it. It is common for claims by the same group, or
arising out of the same situation, to be articulated simultaneously within
different domains. The domain of discourse in which the claim is articu-
lated and assessed will affect its political and legal nature, perceptions of
its justification and merits, and the form of its legal expression and reso-
lution, for both claimants and respondents. 5 There are both overlaps
4. The claims of the Korean minority in Japan appear to have been expressed
and addressed primarily in this latter domain of discourse. See Onuma Yasuaki, Inter-
play Between Human Rights Activities and Legal Standards of Human Rights: A Case Study on
the Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 515 (1992).
5. For instance, there may well be political and legal differences depending on
whether a particular indigenous land rights claim is: a claim to reassert an anterior
sovereignty; a claim to special measures justified on grounds of the special historical
circumstances of an indigenous people; a means of attaining a degree of self-determi-
nation; a general minority rights claim which should also be open to other minorities;
simply a substantive equality claim. Cf the issues relating to the Pitjantjatjara Land
Rights Act (1981) (South Australia) (a state act providing for the vesting of title to a
large area of land in the northwest of South Australia in the Pitjantjatjara people),
and the decision on the validity of sections of this act by the High Court of Australia
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and conflicts between the different domains. The conflicts come sharply
into focus where particular competing programs are in contention, as
where conflicts appear between programs of group autonomy and gen-
der equality. 6 Often the rights and interests of one group are articu-
lated and protected under one program, but this program does not itself
take adequate account of the rights and interests of other groups or of
affected individuals. 7 An important part of the international normative
agenda is to address such conflicts between programs, to avoid the
structure of irreconcilable clashes between competing universal norms.
Why is the development of a general international normative frame-
work an objective worth pursuing? Law in this area has many functions,
including that of mandating or guiding behavior of parties and non-par-
ties, structuring coordinated responses, providing procedures for dis-
pute or conflict resolution, and establishing the basis for an
authoritative, perhaps even dispositive, decision. Particularly important
for present purposes is the compliance-pull exerted by legal norms.
One useful account of compliance-pull in international law is Franck's
discussion of legitimacy. 8 In his terminology: "Legitimacy is a property
of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward com-
pliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe
that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accord-
ance with generally accepted principles of right process." Expressed
this way, legitimacy is a function of the norm-creating process and of
fairness and efficacy in implementation. This interpretation of legiti-
macy resembles Fuller's inner morality of law in the emphasis on propri-
ety of sources and of operation. 10 Certainly this form of procedural
in Gerhardy v. Brown, 57 A.L.R. 472 (High Court of Australia 1985) (per curiam)(upholding Section 19 of the state act, which had been challenged as contrary to the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975, a commonwealth act).
6. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (discrimination
suit against tribe barred under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968); Attorney-Gen-
eral of Canada v. Lavell, 1974 S.C.R. 1349 (Sup. Ct. Can.) (provisions of the Indian
Act excluding women of Indian birth who marry non-Indians from the tribe are not
rendered inoperative by the Canadian Bill of Rights); Lovelace v. Canada, 68 I.L.R.
17 (1981) (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.) (denying female Indian who married a non-
Indian the right to live on a reservation violates international covenant on civil and
political rights).
7. Some well-known examples of problems of this type are summarized in Doug-
las Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 368, 378-86 (1991). This theme is
developed by Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 1 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
8. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990).
Franck seeks to advance the voluntarist thesis that nations (coterminous with states in
this usage) obey rules "[b]ecause they perceive the rule and its institutional penum-
bra to have a high degree of legitimacy." Id. at 25.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969). Franck's
correlates of rule legitimacy include pedigree (meaning "the depth of the rule's roots
in a historical process"), determinacy ("the rule's ability to communicate content"),
coherence ("the rule's internal consistency and lateral connectedness to the princi-
ples underlying other rules"), and adherence ("the rule's vertical connectedness to a
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justice is important to international compliance-pull. Indeed, one of the
concerns about international responses to the emergence of new states
in the territory of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was that norms of
minority protection, in particular, were being invented in the heat of the
moment, applied on a case-by-case basis to new states by existing states
which were not domestically committed to their internal application, and
propounded without adequate systems of international monitoring and
enforcement.
Franck, however, takes the further step of avoiding making legiti-
macy contingent on substantive justice, arguing that the secular interna-
tional community must be distinguished from the moral community, and
that in view of divergent perceptions of justice it is imperative for the
global secular rule community to focus instead on legitimacy.'1 He
adheres to this view notwithstanding that "a legitimate rule may pull less
powerfully toward compliance when it is seen to be unjust.' 2 In rela-
tion to non-state claims which, to the state directly involved, have an
acutely internal character, the compliance-pull arising from interna-
tional legitimacy may well be insufficient to influence the behavior of the
state unless there is also some perception that vindication of the claim
does not involve profound injustice for the state and its major constitu-
encies. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, to the extent that the behavior
of non-state groups is directly affected by the compliance-pull of inter-
national norms: the more so because the direct involvement of these
groups in the rule-making and supervision process has typically been
very limited.
Does "legitimacy" have a definite meaning, and do the components
of legitimacy have a significant impact on the effectiveness of interna-
tional law? Koskenniemi argues that as used by Franck, " '[l]egitimacy'
is an intermediate concept whose very imprecision makes it available to
avoid the attacks routinely mounted against the formal (but too abstract)
idea of legal validity and the substantive (but too controversial) notion
ofjustness."' 3 The "imprecision" referred to by Koskenniemi is a func-
tion of intermediacy between these poles: the concept of legitimacy is
not itself incapable of concrete application. Doubtless the principal use
of the concept of legitimacy as here articulated is by neo-liberal advo-
cates of international cooperation in positing explanations of interna-
tional behavior which go beyond those of classic realism. Nevertheless,
the concept has a wider attraction, and does not involve discarding the
insights of realism. Some variant of legitimacy is part of the explanation
for rule-governed behavior, but the configurations of power and interest
normative hierarchy, culminating in an ultimate rule of recognition, which embodies
the principled purposes and values that define the community of states"). Thomas
M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46, 51 (1992).
11. FRANCK, supra note 8, at 236.
12. Id. at 242.
13. Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 175 (1992) (reviewing
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)).
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also remain central to any understanding of relations between states and
non-state groups.
The configurations of power and interest have limited the effective-
ness, and hence the scope of claims by non-state groups since 1945.
New states emerging in Europe have accepted commitments to protect
minority rights through their domestic legal orders, and to tolerate
international supervision through such mechanisms as those established
by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
This is undoubtedly both a response to international pressure and a
reflection of the overwhelming interest of the new states in providing
any undertakings necessary to secure recognition of their statehood.
However, acknowledgement that the acceptance and honoring by states
of such commitments is influenced by perceptions of their interests does
not itself call into question the significance of legitimacy as an independ-
ent variable. External forces encouraging and even coercing compliance
with legitimate norms and institutions are themselves, in part, a product
of the collective interest in maintaining legitimacy. In addition to the
pressures from these external forces, the other factors of compliance-
pull identified by Franck have played, and continue to play, a significant
role.
The remainder of this article will be structured as follows. Section
II will examine the five domains of discourse within which claims by
non-state groups are typically expressed in international law. Section III
will discuss the presently unsolved problem of how the principle of self-
determination can be reconciled with the concern of states to maintain
their territorial integrity and with the concern of the international com-
munity not to risk unlimited fragmentation of existing states. Section IV
will use a recent case study relating to the three general domains of dis-
course to illustrate the difficulties of developing ad hoc responses to
acute issues raised by non-state claims where no adequate normative or
procedural framework has been established in advance. This case study
is of the views of the Arbitration Commission, established by the Con-
ference on Yugoslavia, on questions as to whether and on what terms
the European Community should recognize the new states which had
formerly been republics of Yugoslavia. Faced with the imperative to
accede to demands for recognition of self-determination by some units,
the EC was not able to establish effective minority rights and human
rights guarantees that might (conceivably) have limited the pressure for
revisionist forms of self-determination. It will be argued that the com-
pliance-pull or legitimacy of the norms and procedures prescribed ad
hoc was thus, almost inevitably, very limited. Section V will examine
some of the implications for the normative development of international
law of recent experience relating to claims by non-state groups, and will
discuss problems arising from the separation of, and limitations of, the
existing domains of discourse.
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II. Five Domains of Discourse for Claims by Non-State Groups
Each of the five international domains of discourse in which claims by
non-state groups are expressed is of considerable contemporary impor-
tance. Three are very general in their range of potential application.
The other two domains of discourse themselves incorporate conditions
of eligibility which, however open-ended, limit the range of situations in
which they may effectively be invoked, and they will be mentioned only
briefly.
A. Self-Determination Claims
The charismatic principle of self-determination, and the nationalism to
which it gives operational expression, has had a powerful normative
appeal for more than a century. The political principle of nationalities
had a significant pedigree before giving way to the more sweeping doc-
trines of self-determination espoused by Lenin and Wilson. In the
United Nations period the principal normative formulations have been
the principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples,"' 4 con-
tained in the UN Charter and elaborated in various subsequent non-
treaty instruments, and the right of all peoples to self-determination,
which is expressed in common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants: "All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development."' 5
Self-determination and its socio-political analog, nationalism, are
often associated, particularly in United States thinking, with liberalism.
This tradition links self-determination with democratic choice, and espe-
cially with "free elections."' 16 Historically, however, nationalism has
been variously associated with liberty and with the suppression of free-
dom, with democratization and with inequality for non-members of the
nation. As Acton (who thought the theory of nationality retrogressive)
wrote in 1862, nationalism "was appealed to in the name of the most
contradictory principles of government, and served all parties in succes-
sion, because it was one in which all could unite."' 17 Self-determination
is not simply an end result or a legal process of choice: as Minogue
points out, nationalism is "a spirit or style of politics."' 8
The rhetoric of self-determination is universal, and the range of
possible claimants (peoples) supported by the rhetoric is very wide. The
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, t 2.
15. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1, 1 (1966).
16. Cf the material discussed in Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Govern-
ance, supra note 10.
17. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Nationality, in EssAYs ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 166, 181 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1948).
18. KENNETH R. MINOGUE, NATIONALISM 135 (1968). He adds his assessment,
based mainly on nineteenth century European examples, that as a style of politics
nationalism is aimed at radical transformation, and "is hostile to long-established
institutions and connections." Id. at 135.
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reality of international practice has been that self-determination has
been available only to a limited range of units, each of which is, in prin-
ciple, eligible for separate statehood if that is the choice of the unit.
Having been interpreted as a right to form separate states, the interna-
tional community has endeavored to limit the right to self-determination
to a very narrow range of rightholders.
Not surprisingly, the practical response of existing states to claims
to separate statehood by new entities has been favorable only in a lim-
ited range of cases, which may be broken down into five principal
categories:' 9
(i) Mandated territories, trust territories, and territories treated as non-
self-governing under Chapter XI of the UN Charter;
(ii) Distinct political-geographical entities subject to carence de souver-
ainet6 (the only entity to have achieved statehood in accordance with
this criterion thus far is Bangladesh, and even this case is not easy to
interpret);20
(iii) Other territories in respect of which self-determination is applied by
the parties, as where a plebiscite it held to determine the fate of a
territory;
(iv) Highest level constituent units of a federal state which has been (or is
in the process of being) dissolved by agreement among all (or, in the
case of Yugoslavia, most) of the constituent units; and possibly
(v) Formerly independent entities reasserting their independence with at
least the tacit consent of the established state where incorporation
into the other state was illegal or of dubious legality. 2 1
Thus most secessionist entities, such as the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus, have received minimal international recognition. 2 2 Irreden-
tist claims on the basis of nationality, such as that espoused by Somalia
before the civil war which began in 1991, have also received very little
support. The general argument against accepting these claims has been
that of territorial integrity and stability of frontiers. Where transitions
have occurred, as in the case of decolonization, these principles are rein-
forced by the doctrine of uti possidetisjuris.23 The doctrine of uti possidetis
19. The first three categories are discussed in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 84-102 (1979).
20. For a recent non-legal analysis of this category, see Alexis Heraclides, Seces-
sion, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis, 45 J. INT'L
AFF. 399-420 (1992).
2 1. It is arguable that the principal candidates for category (v), the recognition of
the three Baltic republics, particularly by states such as Spain and the Netherlands
which had recognized their incorporation de jure into the USSR (see Recognition of
States (A. V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds.), 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 474 (1992)),
and the prospect of the gradual recognition of Eritrea, could properly be accommo-
dated within category (iii).
22. The question of a "right to secede" raises different issues from the right to
self-determination, and is not addressed in this article. For a recent discussion of
some of the questions of political philosophy relating to a "right to secede," see
ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUM-
TER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991).
23. This doctrine states that parties should retain possession of that which they
have acquired.
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juris has been invoked to limit the fragmentation of dissolved or dis-
integrated federations in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia, in what
will represent, if generally accepted, 24 a significant extension of the doc-
trine. Whereas in decolonization the boundaries set by one or more
colonial powers are inherited by the new states without regard to ethnic
or other considerations, here the internal boundaries of federal states
were treated as establishing the international boundaries unless modi-
fied by agreement. In the case of Yugoslavia, this was treated by the EC
as entailing that units within Republics, such as Kosovo, were not enti-
tled to separate statehood. The Federal Constitution, under which
Republics were the federating units and were alone entitled to secede,
was cited as establishing the legal framework in respect of which the
principle of uti possidetisjuris would apply. While this is readily intelligi-
ble as an attempt to prevent virtually unlimited fragmentation, the logic
of accepting statehood for Republics while denying any right to state-
hood to sub-Republic entities which enjoyed a considerable degree of
autonomy within the federal state, and the exact status of which
depended on particular political configurations and internal legal prac-
tices, is not itself compelling. Some of the difficulties with this approach
are presently being confronted in the former Soviet Union. Within the
15 Union Republics of the USSR there were 20 Autonomous Republics,
8 Autonomous Regions (oblast), 10 Autonomous Areas (okrug), and
many lower-level units, as well as numerous groups now seeking auton-
omy rights. 25
B. Minority Rights Claims
There is a sharp contrast between the sweeping entitlements associated
in standard international practice with the right to self-determination
and the very limited provisions applicable expressly to minorities since
1945. Minority protection provisions have long been included in bilat-
eral treaties or in multilateral treaties involving particular territories or
areas, 2 6 and there were several 19th century examples of diplomatic
24. As this article goes to press Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Georgia,
and other former highest-level republics are divided de facto, although there is, as
yet, no indication that the international community has reached the point of formally
endorsing non-peaceful (or at least non-negotiated) divisions in any of these cases.
25. See 1977 U.S.S.R. Constitution, arts. 82-88, reprinted in John N. Hazard, The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990); see generally BOHDAN
NAHAYLO & VICTOR SWOBODA, SOVIET DISUNION: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONALITIES
PROBLEM IN THE USSR 360-61 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Treaty of Utrecht, April 12, 1713, Eng.-Fr., art. 15;Jay Treaty, 1794,
Eng.-U.S., art. 3; Third Additional Article to the 1822 Treaty between Great Britain
and Muscat on the Prohibition of the Slave Trade (added in 1839); Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. 11; and Berlin Conference, Feb. 26, 1885,
final act. Concerning the Balkans, see, e.g., the 1830 Treaty on the Independence of
Greece; the Protocol of the Conference of Constantinople (1856); the Treaty of San
Stefano, Mar. 3, 1878; Treaty of Berlin,July 13, 1878; and Treaty of Constantinople,
Sept. 29, 1913.
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representations or military intervention in response to oppression of
minorities. 2 7 A more general (although far from universal) institutional
system of minority protection, involving the League of Nations and the
Permanent Court of International Justice, was a particular feature of the
public order of Europe, 1919-39. This model fell into disfavor during
and after the Second World War. The focus shifted away from minority
rights to universalization of individual human rights, although several
local minority protection arrangements were adopted on a case-by-case
basis, 28 and the UN was required to face a number of contentious
minority questions.2 9  Minority concerns are partially addressed
through equality and non-discrimination provisions, and other human
rights norms. However, the cautiously-worded Article 27 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (I.C.C.P.R.) remains for
the time being the only express and legally binding minority rights pro-
vision of general application. 30 Article 27 provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.
This provision is narrow in scope, and does not adequately address
the range of minorities issues with which the international community is
again being confronted. 3 1
27. See, e.g., Antoine Rougier, La theorie de lintervention d'humanite, 17 REVUE
GtN-RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 468 (1910); G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, Note
sur la theorie du droit d'intervention, 8 REVUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Er LEGISLATION
CO IPARtE 673 (1876); President Harrison's message to the U.S. Congress in 1891,
quoted in 83 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 427,436-37 (1897); and RAYMOND PEAR-
SON, NATIONAL MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 1848-1945 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Special Statute for the Free City of Trieste, Memorandum of Under-
standing 1954, Italy-U.K.-USA-Yugoslavia, 538 U.N.T.S. 99, providing in detail for
the "unhampered cultural development" of the minorities in each zone; the guaran-
tees for the Slovene and Croat minorities in the Austrian State Treaty, 1955, arts. 7 &
26, 217 U.N.T.S. 223; the Treaty of Guarantee, 1960, U.K.-Greece-Turkey-Cyprus,
382 U.N.T.S. 3, recognizing the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the
1960 Cyprus Constitution (now essentially inoperative as regards the rights and pow-
ers accorded to each community-cf., G.A. Res. 37/253, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
calling for "a mutually acceptable agreement based on the fundamental and legiti-
mate rights of the two communities"); and the Treaty of Osimo, 1975, Italy-Aus.,
providing for an autonomy regime for Bolzano-Bozen. Francisco Capotorti, Study on
the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religions and Linguistic Minorities, Special Rap-
porteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, at 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.I (1977).
29. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44(I) concerning the treatment of Indians in South Africa,
U.N. Doc. A/Res./44/1; and S.C. Res. 47 (1948) asking that India ensure that
"minorities in all parts of the State (Jammu and Kashmir] are accorded adequate
protection."
30. The wording of Article 27 was adopted mutatis nutandis in the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, art. 30 (1989), with the exception that members of
indigenous peoples were there referred to separately from members of minorities.
31. Probably the most influential current definition of "minority" is Capotorti's:
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The subject of minorities is extremely sensitive for many states.
Such concerns have been reflected to some extent in the Human Rights
Committee, which has been divided over numerous issues concerning
the application of Article 27, and has been unable even to adopt a Gen-
eral Comment on the article.3 2
Article 27 is a limited provision. Several of the leading cases on it
have in fact been brought by individual members of minority communi-
ties seeking what was in effect protection from policies of the minority
community itself. As to the scope for protection of the interests of
minority communities under Article 27, questions remain regarding the
extent to which it places states under a duty to take positive measures,
whether the right to enjoy "culture" extends to land and resource
rights, and whether it effectively establishes rights for human groups as
such. The case of Ominayak v. Canada33 was one of the most expansive
decisions of the Human Rights Committee on the two latter questions.
The case involved a claim brought by a group of Canadian indigenous
people who had never received an adequate area of land and had suf-
fered disastrous problems as a probable result. The Committee found
that:
Historical inequities, to which the State party refers, and certain more
recent developments threaten the way of life and culture of the Lubicon
Lake Band, and constitute a violation of Article 27 so long as they con-
tinue. The State party proposes to rectify the situation by a remedy that
the Committee deems appropriate within the meaning of Article 2 of the
Covenant.34
This implies that the right of members of a group to enjoy their culture
may be violated where they are not allocated the land and control of
resource development necessary to pursue economic activities of central
importance to their culture, such as hunting or trapping. The right to
enjoyment of culture also seems to extend to maintenance of the
group's cohesiveness through, for instance, possession of a land base
and pursuit of important cultural activities of an economic nature.
3 5
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State -.possess
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed
toward preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.
Capotorti Report, supra note 28, p. 96, para. 568. See also Jules Desch~nes, Proposal
Concerning A Definition of the Term "Minority", at 30, para. 181, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1985/31 (1985); and the discussion of Desch~nes' report in the Sub-Commis-
sion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.13-16. See further PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 1-21 (1991).
32. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.625 and SR.633 (1985).
33. Final Views, March 26, 1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990).
34. Id. at 29.
35. See also Kitok v. Sweden, Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 221, U.N. Doc.
A/43/40 (1988), where the Committee implies that the right of an individual Sami to
engage in reindeer husbandry as a member of a Sami community is protected by
Article 27.
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While longstanding or "traditional" economic activities are more likely
to fall within the ambit of "culture," this is a matter of appreciation; no
such limitation is inherent in Article 27.
The dispositif in Ominayak is very brief and is not easy to interpret.
Nevertheless, the finding that historical inequities which continued were
a major component of the violation is potentially very significant. In
Ominayak, historical inequities resulted especially from the failure of
Canada (including, for responsibility purposes, the Province of Alberta)
to honor the terms of a treaty with indigenous people (Treaty 8), and
possibly also the terms of certain legislation, by ensuring reasonable
land rights for the Lubicon Lake Band. In particular, they were never
allocated a suitable reservation despite a morally (and perhaps legally)
compelling claim to one. The recent developments included rapid
energy and other developments in the Band's traditional area from the
early 1970s onward, with serious repercussions for the Band's hunting
and trapping activities as well as for the life of the community. Thus
Canada was responsible under the Covenant for the failure to rectify a
continuing inequity, notwithstanding that the initial injustices predated
the entry into force of the Covenant by many years.
It is also of interest that the Human Rights Committee's views in
Ominayak address the position of the Band rather than the rights of Chief
Ominayak, although he was the only individual author. This is an illus-
tration of how Article 27 is likely to be regarded increasingly as a vehicle
for direct recognition of collective rights.
It is clear that if some very serious conflicts are to be adequately
addressed, more comprehensive and more detailed provisions for
minority protection are needed, and that such provisions will only func-
tion effectively with adequate and dependable international supervision,
monitoring, and national and international enforcement mechanisms.
Two approaches to normative development are presently being pur-
sued: particularized country-specific obligations, and general normative
instruments.
1. Particularized Obligations
The first possible approach is to endeavor to secure the acceptance by
specific states of particularized obligations with respect to minorities.
Particularized obligations are naturally favored by representatives of
non-target states, who are reluctant to assume potentially intrusive
international obligations in this sensitive area. Policymakers from coun-
tries where potential ethnic fissures have not developed likewise do not
wish to encourage latent tendencies to ethnic division within their own
countries through promulgation of sweeping minority rights norms of
general application, although there is debate about the risks and bene-
fits of general normative commitments in such situations. A particular-
ized approach was proposed by the EC in the November 1991 Draft
Cornell International Law Journal
Convention on Yugoslavia,3 6 but even if the obstacles are overcome and
such an instrument is eventually adopted by the states of former Yugo-
slavia, it is unlikely that many other states will be induced to undertake
such customized obligations in the absence of general agreement.
There are also serious problems of supervision and of enforcement with
respect to such instruments.
The experience of the League of Nations is an important reminder
of the difficulties facing such a particularized approach. In total, some
25 treaties dealing with minorities in Europe were concluded and
entered into force between 1919 and 1934.3 7 The minorities treaties
established that minority issues were, in certain circumstances, appro-
priate matters for international concern. Individuals and groups were
provided with a forum of moderate effectiveness to which to address
complaints,3 8 but they did not have direct rights to a hearing or a rem-
edy. 39 Some cases were settled effectively, but non-state petitioners had
no formal standing or right to representation, little access to informa-
tion on the progress of their petition, no power to expedite it or to
appeal against an adverse finding, and no certainty of their individual
grievances being rectified. This was especially so if they lacked the back-
ing of an influential state. The obligations concerning minorities were
imposed on new states, defeated states, or states struggling to attain full
international sovereignty. They did not apply to established victor
states, and did relatively little in practice to protect any minorities
outside Europe. They did not apply to any of the Great Powers except
36. Treaty Provisions for the Convention (1991) (text issued by the EC
Commission).
37. These provisions have been treated, in general, as having ceased to have
effect on account of the fundamental change of circumstances wrought by the Second
World War and the ensuing reordering of the international system. See generally U.N.
Secretariat, Study on the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/367/Add.1 (1950). It is possible that certain of the instruments may never-
theless retain legal significance for specific and limited purposes-see, e.g., Louis B.
SOHN & THOMAS M. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
304-5 (1973), concerning Greece and Turkey. A number were clearly superseded by
post-1944 instruments, including peace treaties and, possibly, the Helsinki Final Act.
New questions may conceivably arise, however, as old states reemerge.
38. Approximately 300 petitions (excluding those concerning Upper Silesia) were
received in the period 1921-29, of which some 150 were declared unreceivable.
More precise statistics concerning petitions were published from 1930: 204 petitions
were received in 1931, 101 in 1932, and between 45 and 70 in 1930, 1933, 1934 and
1935. After 1935 the numbers plummeted, and the Minorities Section was dissolved
in 1939. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/6 (1947); and JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE
THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 124-34 (1943).
39. In League practice a procedure evolved whereby petitions received from any
non-anonymous source alleging violations of minorities treaties were first considered
by the Minorities Section of the Secretariat which determined (subject to appeal by
states) whether they were receivable, solicited responses from the governments con-
cerned, and played an important intermediary role. Receivable complaints were con-
sidered by committees of the League Council, which could drop the case, refer it to
the Council, or initiate "informal and benevolent negotiations." For assessment of
the procedure, see, for example, PABLO DE AZCARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND
NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN EXPERIMENT (Eileen E. Brooke trans., 1945).
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Germany, and then only in respect of. Upper Silesia. The States bound
by minorities obligations not unnaturally tended to resent the discrimi-
nation inherent in this selective minority protection, and compliance
and supervision problems became increasingly acute throughout the lat-
ter part of the 1930s. Proposals for a general international treaty on
minorities were made frequently, but once the particularized obligations
were established it was not surprising that other states showed little
interest in a universal instrument under which they would also assume
obligations. This difficulty also confronts contemporary particularist
efforts.
2. Development of General Norms on Rights of Minorities
Urgent efforts are now being directed to implementing the second
approach: developing additional and more detailed normative stan-
dards, together with more effective and systematic procedures for imple-
mentation and enforcement. A Working Group of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights has, after many years of slow progress,
been able to elaborate a draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities for
consideration by the UN General Assembly. 40 The Council of Europe is
considering a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice
Commission) in 1991 proposed that the Council of Europe adopt a
European Convention for the Protection of Minorities, implementation
of which would be supervised by a European Committee for the Protec-
tion of Minorities. 4 1 The CSCE included a cautious provision on minor-
ities in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to the effect that:
The Participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will
respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality
before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoy-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner,
protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.4 2
The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension
(1990) contains much more elaborate provisions, which have been reit-
erated and elaborated in subsequent CSCE documents.4 3 The CSCE
has also begun to contribute significantly to monitoring and supervision.
40. It is ironic that the Commission on Human Rights finally reached agreement
on a modest draft Declaration in the shadow of the human misery accompanying the
disintegration of Yugoslavia; the diplomatic impetus for such a Declaration was for
many years provided by Yugoslavia, and a Yugoslav representative chaired the Work-
ing Group.
41. For text of the proposed Convention, see 12 HuM. RTs. L.J. 269 (1991).
Other proposals for Council of Europe action have also been mooted, including a
Protocol on minority rights to the European Convention on Human Rights.
42. Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States,
section VII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Report to the CSCE Council from the CSCE Seminar of Experts on
Democratic Institutions (1991), 31 I.L.M. 375 (1992).
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The Vienna Mechanism for monitoring of state compliance with CSCE
commitments, and other Mechanisms in place or being developed, may
help promote compliance in certain limited classes of situations where
other states take a particular interest in the target state's treatment of
minorities. The provision in the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Document for
appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities with
power to monitor national minority issues and to provide early warning
to the Committee of Senior Officials is a step toward more general
independent monitoring and supervision, although the effectiveness of
this step will depend on the stature and resources of the High Commis-
sioner as well as further supervision and sanctions initiatives. The High
Commissioner's mandate relates to groups: the High Commissioner is
expressly barred from considering "violations of CSCE commitments
with regard to an individual person belonging to a national minority." 4 4
C. Human Rights Claims
The principles of human rights are a major source of legitimation for
claims by non-state groups. 45 Such human rights claims have the great-
est purchase when articulated as claims by aggregates of individuals who
are seeking vindication only of the same rights as those enjoyed or
espoused by other members of the ambient society. More difficult
problems arise with this domain of discourse where the claim of the
group is couched as something more than simply an aggregate of indi-
vidual rights claims, or where the rights sought are not demonstrably
identical with those enjoyed by the ambient population. In these and
other situations the discourse of human rights and equality may lose its
purchase for non-state groups, and they may find that their claims are
opposed by others on human rights grounds. Equality rights, like other
human rights, inure for the benefit of everyone, and may thus provide
grounds for upholding or for rejecting a particular group claim.
The paucity of provisions for express minority rights has meant that
many of the claims of non-dominant groups have been assessed only in
the standard universalist discourse of human rights. Turpe14 6 rightly
draws attention to the very cautious approach of the Human Rights
Committee in its interpretation of the right to participate in public
affairs (Article 25 of the I.C.C.P.R.) in the case brought by Mikmaq lead-
ers with respect to the refusal of the Canadian Government to accept
direct Mikmaq Grand Council participation in the First Ministers Con-
ferences on matters concerning aboriginal peoples.4 7 The general right
to political participation in constitutional deliberations was treated as
44. The Challenges of Change, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions,
Chapter II (on file with author).
45. Cf Onuma, supra note 4.
46. Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political Participation and Self-
Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Stnggle for Recog-
nition, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 579 (1992).
47. Human Rights Committee Final Views (Communication No. 205/1986) A1ikmaq
Tribal Society v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 (1991).
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being satisfied by the national system of representative government.
The Human Rights Committee did not regard Article 25 as necessitating
specific representation of particular groups, no matter that the agenda
item may be of particular importance to them, and no matter that they
may not be satisfied with their "representation" in the representative
system. The concern of the Human Rights Committee to maintain a
universalist interpretation of the Covenant, and thus not to set stan-
dards for political participation in one polity which it might feel unable
to apply in another, is evident in the case law. The Committee's reti-
cence is compounded by its unwillingness to adopt the concept of a mar-
gin of appreciation, so that its findings of no violation appear not simply
as refusals to substitute its judgment for that of the state, but as legiti-
mations of state policy. While the Committee has good reasons not to
take an overly expansive view of its own role too quickly, and to empha-
size universality, it has not done enough to elaborate the meaning of
participation and representation in plural societies.
While the scope of existing norms is sometimes underestimated,
there is a need for further normative development to deal with difficult
problems in relating claims by non-state groups to human rights and
equality norms. Non-state groups typically emphasize the need for
greater sensitivity in accommodating their concerns within a human
rights framework. It is also important that effective means be devised to
hold non-state groups accountable, in appropriate circumstances, for
their own violations of human rights. More generally, norms and proce-
dures to resolve conflicts between group claims and rights of individual
members of the group require further refinement, particularly where
state power or other third party interests are involved.
D. Claims by Indigenous Peoples
Claims based on prior occupation or "indigeneity," which are discussed
extensively in the articles by Lam and Turpel in this issue, 48 have the
politically important characteristic of distinguishing and narrowing the
range of potential claimants. Claims based on the special status of
indigenous peoples are made by non-state groups in most parts of the
world, and are aired internationally in the UN's Working Group on
Indigenous Populations and many other fora. 49 The term "indigenous
people" is not yet well defined, 50 and the label "indigenous" has with-
out doubt been arrogated on occasion to legitimize chauvinist assertions
contrary to the human rights of others.5 ' Nevertheless, the category of
"indigenous peoples" is a circumscribed one; it may well come to influ-
48. Maivfn Clech Lim, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Pro-
yoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 603 (1992);
Turpel, supra note 46.
49. See generally Lam, supra note 48.
50. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples'" as an International Legal
Concept, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN ASIA (R.H. Barnes et al. eds., forthcoming).
51. Compare the argument made by Ved P. Nanda, Ethnic Conflict in Fiji and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565 (1992).
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ence discourse in the other three categories, but this process is only just
beginning. At present indigenous peoples also utilize other domains of
discourse in pursuing their claims. Cree in Quebec, for example, have
argued that if the province proceeded to exercise the right to self-deter-
mination, the Cree would have a separate international legal right to
self-determination; that historically Cree sovereignty was not surren-
dered to Quebec and could properly be (re)asserted; and that, interna-
tional norms specifically applicable to indigenous peoples would also
apply.5 2
E. Historical Sovereignty Claims
Historically-based claims to sovereignty typically involve an assertion of
territorial exclusivity. Although historical assertions are an important
element in many claims to sovereignty (including some by "indigenous
peoples"), claims of major international political significance directed
toward a change of international sovereignty, in which historical
revendication was the chief domain of discourse, had until recently
largely been limited to: claims to retrocession of small colonial territo-
ries, such as Hong Kong, the Falklands/Malvinas, or Gibraltar; irreden-
tist claims pursued without much immediate success, such as that of
Venezuela in respect of part of Guyana and that of Guatemala in respect
of Belize;53 certain boundary disputes; and possibly a small range of
special situations where such historical assertions either accompanied or
contradicted claims couched in terms of self-determination or rights of
indigenous peoples. More recently, however, such assertions of histori-
cal sovereignty have been important in the dissolution or disintegration
of federal states, and were crucial in legitimizing the claims to indepen-
dence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at a time when it seemed highly
possible that decisionmakers in the Soviet Union would consider trying
to use military force to prevent these claims from succeeding.
F. Impact of Legal Structure on Formulation of Claims
The structure of the law has had a strong shaping effect on international
discourse; thus an inordinate amount of attention has been focused on
the refusal of some states to describe indigenous groups internationally
as indigenous peoples (even though these states use the term peoples
freely in domestic political discourse). The equally fervent strategy on
the part of some indigenous peoples is to secure recognition interna-
52. See Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), Status and Rights of the James Bay
Crees in the Context of Quebec's Secession from Canada, Submission to UN Commission on
Human Rights, February 1992 (United Nations files, Geneva).
53. To clarify the terms in this article, "secession" refers to attempts by a group
within a state to withdraw from state control part of the territory and population of
the state. "Irredentism" refers to attempts to alter state borders so as to combine
groups presently separated by one or more borders, the groups to be combined
either in an existing state or in a new state. See generally Donald Horowitz, Irredentas
and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections, in IRREDENTISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 9-22 (Naomi Chazan ed., 1991).
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tionally as "peoples" so that they will win much of the battle with
respect to all other claims. Legal structure-the preoccupation with
"peoples" or "minorities"-interacts with social science and media clas-
sification to artificially reduce a great many claims and conflicts to single
categories. In particular, there is a clear preoccupation with "ethnic"
claims and "ethnic" conflicts (taking ethnicity to include religious and
linguistic elements). These classifications are often simplistic, and miss
important parts of identities,5 4 and of the structure of claims and con-
flicts, including their territorial,5 5 historical, resource, and class aspects.
The power of the lexicon shapes the way in which claims are formulated
and groups define themselves: thus, for instance, the scramble to be
considered one of the "backward classes" in India,5 6 or the rapid adop-
tion among many non-state groups in Asia of the self-description "indig-
enous people" as it has become an empowering term internationally,
even where the very same group may still have origin myths which
recount their migration and subordination of another group still living
in the same territory. Where a conflict may be largely about access to
resources or about social stratification, the temptation for outsiders, and
for participants, is often to define it as ethnic, thus clouding analysis and
perhaps eventually altering its structure. 5 7
Persuasive arguments are made that in some situations attention
ought to focus on the inadequacies of a system that does not secure fair
access to positions in the civil administration and the military, rather
than on ethnic tensions associated with marginalization. Powerful
voices argue that normative acceptance of extensive claims couched in
terms of ethnicity or other group identity provides a strong incentive for
claims to be formulated this way, leads politics to become irretrievably
dominated by ethnic demands and divisions, and impels the society and
eventually the polity toward fracture.5 8 Many states deny that ethnic dif-
ferences exist. Others assert that the differences that exist are not (and
ought not to be) of any significance for the law, and in some states vari-
ous peaceful forms of ethnic self-assertion are prohibited as threats to
national unity. While some such denials and prohibitions are abusive,
chauvinist ethnic claims have undoubtedly contributed to terrible ethnic
conflicts, and there are proper concerns about deepening or causing
divisions, and about fanning conflict.
54. See, e.g., FREDRIK BARTH, ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES (1970).
55. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpreta-
tion, 16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
56. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD
CLASSES IN INDIA (1984).
57. In a similar vein, Minogue correctly warns about overestimating the centrality
of nationalism: "It is the business of the ideologist of nationalism to persuade us that
history culminates in nationalism.... Ideologists, like egoists, see little else but their
own reflection, and it is part of their strength that they should do so." KENNETH
MINOGUE, NATIONALISM 25 (1967).
58. See, e.g., ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM (1960); and Solomon F. Bloom, The
Peoples of .My Home Town: Before Nationalism Crushed Rumania "s Design For Living, CoM-
MENTARY 329-35 (1947).
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Not every claim by a non-state group has equal (nor necessarily any)
moral merit. Blanket moral relativism about such claims attracts a
strong charge of moral irresponsibility. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) addresses one aspect of this issue in
providing that nothing in the Covenant "may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and free-
doms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for. . . -59 The further question of whether it is possible or
desirable to prescribe general substantive norms in these areas is highly
problematic. The circumspection of international tribunals in this area
is to be noted: indeed, the scope for most non-state groups to bring
claims remains very limited. On the other hand, it is clear that the
claims of non-state groups, and the related problems of structuring rela-
tionships between states and non-state groups, are of central and endur-
ing concern in contemporary international society. While they ought
not to obscure other important questions from view, the dangers associ-
ated with abusive claims and demagoguery must be kept firmly in mind.
The strategy of ignoring questions concerning the relations between
states and non-state groups is neither viable nor internationally
supported.
Having outlined the structure of the existing domains of discourse
and pointed to the general need for further normative development,. the
next section will indicate a specific strategy for future development of
the law concerning self-determination in a manner that both enhances
the ability of the international community to respond to current
problems and better reconciles the three general domains of discourse.
I. Self-Determination
The appeal of the principle of self-determination has long rested (in
part) on its generalizability, indeed its ostensible universality. At no
stage have justifications of a general principle of self-determination suc-
cessfully escaped the conundrum presented by the fact that legitimiza-
tion of the claims of any one group has implications for the interests and
claims of many other groups. The principal strategies intended to make
it possible both to invoke and to limit self-determination have been
either to call upon countervailing principles, such as territorial integrity,
or to try to formulate claims to self-determination as rights claims with a
limited category of rightholders, described as "peoples." A more prom-
ising strategy, insufficiently pursued, is to argue that the right to self-
determination is a generalized right but that its realization does not
always entail the option of separate statehood, and that its application in
specific circumstances depends on those same circumstances. This
strategy entails recognizing a degree of unity of justificatory principle
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. art. 5.
para. 1 (1966).
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between self-determination, autonomy, rights to language, culture, and
participation, equality and non-discrimination, and general human
rights in plural societies. 60 A major attraction of such a unified
approach is that it allows for the rights and interests of non-members of
the group-or even dissentient members-to be weighed on the same
scale as the claim to self-determination. This aids in ensuring that the
rights of all are effectively protected during the immediate self-determi-
nation process and after any ensuing transition. This is of particular
importance where a territory is shared by more than one group. Such
considerations suggest that it may be desirable to reexamine self-deter-
mination at the theoretical normative level. What follows is a tentative
pointer toward one possible strategy-and it is not itself free from
problems-for reconceptualizing self-determination. 6 1 It is not
intended as an examination of lex lata or even lex ferenda.
A. Defining Rightholders
The phrase "all peoples have the right to self-determination," found
inter alia in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, has for three decades been reified as the governing normative
stipulation. The accompanying description of what the right entails
("By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"), and the
other rights or powers conferred on "[a]ll peoples" in e.g., Article 1(2)
of the 1966 Covenants, have been read back as indicators that the cate-
gory of rightholders ("peoples") must in fact be narrow. So narrow,
indeed, according to most states, that the expression "peoples" has
been stripped of its ordinary meaning and reconstructed as something
quite different. This attempt to contain the category of rightholders
within very narrow bounds is showing some signs of breaking down.
Historically there have been opposing tendencies in the rhetoric (and
indeed in practice) of self-determination, toward, on the one hand, uni-
versalizing, and, on the other hand, containing, the principle. The sub-
stantive tendency to universalization, while to some extent in eclipse
again from the decolonization debates until the late 1980s, has not been
permanently subdued. Rhetorically, the use of the phrase "all peoples"
60. Recognition of the difficulties of drawing principled distinctions which would
tightly control the number of new entities eligible for statehood, and of the value of
"minority rights" as a means of avoiding demands for statehood, is evident in the UN
Secretary-General's report "An Agenda For Peace."
The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or
linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation,
and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more
difficult .... One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in com-
mitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities,
whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic.
At 5, U.N. Doc A/47/277 (1992).
61. Much of the following discussion is based on a more specific argument made
in Benedict Kingsbury, Self-Determination and "Indigenous Peoples," 86 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW (forthcoming 1992).
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to designate the category of rightholders has provided an opening which
many non-state groups have been energetic in exploiting.
According to the strategy discussed here, what is needed is to get
beyond the arid assumption that, in the field of self-determination, the
act of classification by reference to one or other of the socio-referential
labels used to identify rightholders is itself determinative of virtually all
questions as to the precise rights involved and their concrete applica-
tion. Thus, for instance, the bifurcation in the Gros Espiell report6 2 and
in some Human Rights Committee practices under the Civil and Polit-
ical Rights Covenant: "peoples" have the right to self-determination
but "minorities" do not. In fact, it is increasingly evident that the right
to self-determination must be more complex, and that its vindication in
any particular situation depends upon the complex matrix of factual and
legal considerations, rather than on the simple assignment of labels.
B. The Meaning of the Right to Self-Determination
The question of what is entailed by "self-determination" is fundamental.
The logic of the principle of self-determination extends beyond the
question of independent statehood, to political and cultural options
exercisable within the established state.63 This point is reinforced by
the increasing emphasis on rights of political participation, on political
structures providing for some degree of genuine representation and
accountability, on a semblance of democratic process in the choice of
government/representatives, and even on the choice of constitutional
order after an upheaval.
When lobbying in the UN about general normative formulations,
groups seeking "self-determination" have tended to maintain that in all
cases self-determination includes the possibility of separate statehood.
On the other hand, many are aware of the strength of the opposition this
elicits among other states and acknowledge that in a large number of
cases (perhaps the majority) separate statehood would not be sought or
would be a most unlikely outcome.64
The notion of a widespread option to form separate states is, to
some, intrinsically destabilizing, whether or not the options are ever
exercised. Many fear cataclysmic division and conflict if any such gen-
eral right is countenanced. A more abstract issue concerns competing
visions of future international order. United Nations membership has
now passed 175, including such "microstates" as Liechtenstein and San
Marino whose suitability for membership had earlier been in doubt. A
multifarious world, with many small states enjoying various relations
with larger neighbors and regional bodies, is no longer far-fetched as a
62. HECTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1980).
63. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 7, at 6; HURST HANNUM, AUToNOMY, SOVER-
EIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 473-77 (1989); and Turpel, supra note 46.
64. See generally INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
ISSUES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE 36-40 (1987).
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vision of the international system, and if attained probably need not of
itself raise disastrous systemic instability problems. On the other hand,
such a proliferation of small states would have significant practical (and
perhaps eventually legal) effects on the nature of statehood, with the
potential for further erosion of assumptions about the essential inci-
dents of state sovereignty. This will be seen by some as an advance
toward an effective international society, and by others as a step toward
the abyss. A possible third perspective, however, held by some mem-
bers of non-state groups, is that this threatens to debase the currency
they are striving to secure. In this respect, the non-state group may
share the perspectives of a good many citizens of decolonized states-
with, however, a potential difference in cases where self-determination
follows ethnic boundaries more closely and where allegiance to the state
is thus slightly less central as a basis of unity.
There is understandable reluctance on the part of representatives of
non-state groups to concede as a normative matter that the right to self-
determination could ever be vindicated where the state(s) dealing with an
ethnic minority dominant in a severable territory refuses to countenance
even the option of separate statehood. Not only does such a concession
appear to risk breaking ranks with, and indeed selling out, groups seek-
ing separate statehood, it also moves away from, and thus risks losing
some of the authority of, the U.N. practice on decolonization. In U.N.
practice (with some glaring exceptions), separate statehood for colonial
units was the presumptive option. In fact, the Special Committee on
Decolonization was deeply suspicious whenever it appeared that another
option might be exercised.
Several observations may be made with respect to this strategic view
that self-determination must always entail the option of separate state-
hood. First, self-determination must be understood, not simply in terms
of end result, but also in terms of process and of political legitimation;
early commitment to the process, and to the legitimacy of the values
associated with self-determination, may in some cases avert separation
or violence. Arrangements for some degree of autonomy within a fed-
eral state structure have in many cases staved off or eclipsed demands
for self-determination that might otherwise have tended toward seces-
sion. A federal structure may also establish units that, should the union
disintegrate or secessionist pressures rise, are better equipped to move
to independent statehood and to take advantage of the stabilizing princi-
ple of uti possidetisjuris.65 On the other hand, autonomy arrangements
do leave important powers de facto or dejure in the hands of the central
authorities; autonomous regions may be vulnerable to resource
exploitation or demographic alteration.
Second, when concrete cases are addressed, there is an element of
reductionism in treating "statehood" as a single outcome, as if this
65. This fact does, of course, contribute to the reticence of powerful forces in
unitary states about assuming a more federal character.
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juridical form utterly transcends the specific features of spatial, eco-
nomic, and political organization, of culture, environment, conflict, and
militarization, which in fact loom large when individuals and groups
come to make any determination for themselves. Inquiries by theorists
into the "archaeology of the state," the "parcelization of sovereignty,"
the localism which has resisted the so-called upward displacement of
power associated with modernization, and even the "ethnography of the
state," all ought to remind us that the simplifications-and the sense of
ultimate-sometimes found in discourses about statehood, may miss
many important human dimensions with which human rights and self-
determination are inevitably and properly bound up.
Third, there is the prudential caution that some of the groups mak-
ing claims now may find themselves resisting them in the not-so-distant
future.
There is nevertheless a deeply entrenched assumption in interna-
tional practice and discourse that what self-determination is about is the
right to determine, under certain conditions, whether a group or unit
wishes to form a separate state or choose some other option. The ques-
tion whether the character of self-determination applies also to situa-
tions where on the facts separate statehood is not a required option
raises the fundamental issue of what justifies the right to self-
determination.
One approach begins with the group, and with the proposition that
the interests of the group itself are sufficient to establish a right. This is
not the basis on which human rights analysis proceeds, although refer-
ence to it is a reminder that self-determination claims are not always
premised on human rights considerations. 66 If self-determination is to
be understood, as international instruments suggest, as a human right,
the starting point must be the value to the interests of individuals of
membership and participation in a particular kind of group. Following
Raz and others, 67 the well-being of a group is related to, but different
from, the aggregation of the interests of individuals.6 8 In some circum-
stances the group's well-being can be secured only where it is self-gov-
erning (or has the option of being self-governing). Self-government is
thus justified instrumentally; the case for an intrinsic justification is
much harder to make. The idea of self-government is broad: it "speaks
of groups determining the character of their social and economic envi-
ronment, their fortunes, the course of their development, and the for-
66. Arguments of this sort have generated a longstanding mistrust about nation-
alism and national self-determination within the tradition of liberalism. As Mac-
Cormick notes: "From Hitler to Ceaucescu, there has been no shortage of illustrative
evils showing how the pursuit of national liberty and national values can lead to deni-
gration, servility, torture and death for those outwith the charmed national circle,
and even for many within it." Neil MacCormick, Is .ationalism Philosophically Credible?,
in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 10-11 (William Twining ed., 1991).
67. See Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHILOS.
439-61 (1990); and generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207-13 (1986).
68. This involves a rejection of methodological individualism.
Vol. 25
1992 Claims by Non-State Groups
tunes of their members by [the groups'] own actions . . ."69 Self-
determination in the sense of a choice among options that include sepa-
rate statehood is a means of attaining self-government. Given the
breadth covered by "self-government" in a range of different situations,
however, it appears that self-determination in this narrow sense by no
means exhausts the means of securing it. Other means of securing the
objectives of (instrumentally-justified) self-government ought thus to be
regarded as sharing the instrumental purposes of the narrow version of
self-determination. While the existing formulations of the right to self-
determination in international instruments do not so extend, provisions
as to other human rights do bear on wider aspects of self-government.
The point to be emphasized is that in their grounds or justifications self-
determination and other rights are not sharply distinct, and depending
on the facts of the particular case, the realization of other rights ought to
be regarded as realizing purposes underlying self-determination. This
being so, at least two possibilities are open. One possibility is to regard
self-determination as the end of a continuum on which other rights ben-
eficial to the group and the purposes it serves are also located. The
other is to reformulate the right of self-determination so that it opens
the way to a wider range of different relations between an ethnic group
styling itself as a distinct "people" and an existing state, dependent not
simply on the choice of the group but also on more precise criteria tied
to the underlying justificatory purposes served by the right.
The first of these approaches has the advantages of being more con-
sistent with established and evolving international law, and of being
somewhat more realistic. A disadvantage of this approach for non-state
"peoples" is that many of the sought rights may emerge only slowly and
with heavy qualifications in general international human rights practice,
and may never have the legitimating force of the general commitment to
self-determination. The second approach could open the way to forms
of functional self-determination for groups that cannot expect to form
separate states because of, for instance, insufficient size or lack of pre-
ponderance in any significant territory. It could also eventually focus
attention on the achievement of the underlying justificatory purposes
for which the right to self-determination is at present a rather blunt,
unnuanced, and underinclusive instrument.
C. Operation of the Right
A statement that a right exists and that it is held by a particular category
of rightholders by no means disposes of all the relevant issues. In prac-
tice, as in legal philosophy, it is quite possible that, while the right must
ground some duties for some other actor(s), these duties will not corre-
late perfectly with the scope of the right. Furthermore, consideration of
the operation of any right must also entail consideration of its conse-
quences. For instance, a right to self-determination may affect persons
69. Margalit & Raz, supra note 67, at 440.
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living in a particular territory who are not members of the group seeking
self-determination, or who are dissentient members not well served by
the group, or who also belong to other welfare- or interest- or auton-
omy-serving groups (with different boundaries) that would be
threatened or fissured by the proposed self-determination, or who sim-
ply belong to some such alternative group and seek self-determination
for it. A typical result of weighing all these factors is that separate state-
hood would not be the optimal outcome, or that it would serve human
rights purposes only where hedged by conditions.
These points reinforce the oft-made point that, while rights might
be trumps, they are not absolute. The discourse of proponents of the
right to self-determination has often had an absolutist overtone. This
has been associated with a tendency to treat self-determination as a one-
shot right, vindicated and exhausted by liberation from alien domina-
tion. A focus on the grounds or justifications of the right reaffirms that
the performance of the group must be continually judged by reference
to the wellbeing of individual members and, in a different way, non-
members. The instrumental justifications of self-government are not
served at all times by every form and means of government. Where a
particular governmental arrangement is grossly failing to serve the pur-
poses on which its instrumental justification rests, it is likely that rights
resting on the same instrumental justification will be invoked in favor of
change. In view of its justification, it would be surprising indeed if the
operational right to self-determination were construed as never
extending to such situations; recent practice strongly supports this view.
Finally, although much of the contemporary discussion about self-
determination relates to outcomes, it is well to recall that much of the
international practice concerning the right to self-determination relates
to issues of process-not simply to who decides or to what the choices
are, but to how the decision is to be made and with what supervision,
accountability and guarantees. In this area, practice has been somewhat
ad hoc; existing international law, including the law and practice of insti-
tutions, is not sufficiently developed, and future international efforts to
set standards must address these issues systematically.
A recent illustration of the limitations of the prevailing domains of
discourse, as presently structured, is the attempts by the European
Community to respond to events in Yugoslavia. These attempts will be
examined as a case study of some of the problems with the present nor-
mative framework.
IV. A Recent Case Study: The European Community and Yugoslavia
The international community has had particular difficulty in responding
to post-cold war claims by new entities, especially those established on
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the territories of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. 70
Here, considerations arising from the traditional law and practice of rec-
ognition of new states and governments have combined with political
concerns about the nature and stability of new entities, and about con-
trolling the rate and extent of state disintegration. European Commu-
nity practice with regard to Yugoslavia exhibits an amalgam of often
contradictory and unreconciled considerations about existing law,
order, and justice. One of the Community's responses to issues arising
in Yugoslavia was to establish the Conference on Yugoslavia. 7 ' In addi-
tion to promoting European Political Cooperation, the EC hoped to use
the Conference to control and condition the pace and nature of transi-
tion in Yugoslavia.
In two Declarations on December 16, 1991, the European Commu-
nity and its member states set forth general guidelines concerning the
recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
These declarations also set forth a policy and procedure whereby the
Conference on Yugoslavia, with the advice of the Arbitration Commis-
sion, 72 would consider requests for recognition from Republics that had
formed part of Yugoslavia. The stated general policy was that new
states would be recognized only if they were democratic, had accepted
the relevant international obligations, and committed themselves to pro-
ceed peacefully and by negotiation in good faith. More precisely, new
states were required to respect the provisions of the UN Charter, the
Helsinki Final Act, and the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe,
particularly concerning the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.
They were expected to guarantee the rights of ethnic and national
groups and of minorities, in conformity with engagements undertaken
within the framework of the CSCE.
This formulation itself is revealing. Outside the declarations of the
CSCE, which are not legally binding, there were no international treaties
that set forth in detail the meaning of-let alone the means of realizing
and ensuring-the rule of law, democracy, or rights of ethnic groups,
national groups, or minorities. Indeed, these latter categories have not
70. The bifurcation of Czechoslovakia, if it does come to pass, may raise compa-
rable issues, although many major questions are likely to remain unresolved for some
time.
71. The Community established a Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord
Carrington, comprising the EC, its member states, the Yugoslav federal government,
and such Republics of the former Yugoslavia as wished to participate. This Confer-
ence began to function in September 1991. It was supplanted in August 1992 by a
broader conference also involving the UN; the plenum was chaired jointly by UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali and British Prime MinisterJohn Major, the
United Kingdom then holding the Presidency of the EC. Carrington resigned as EC
special envoy just before this conference.
72. The Arbitration Commission, established by the EC alongside the Confer-
ence on Yugoslavia, comprised presiding judges from constitutional courts of EC
member states under the Presidency of Robert Badinter, President of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel. The Commission was not in fact empowered to arbitrate
claims, but was expected to respond to requests for advice from the Conference.
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been fully defined. Furthermore, CSCE member states took very differ-
ent views as to the meaning of relevant CSCE commitments when
applied to themselves, such as the French position on the non-existence
of minorities within the French Republic. In the case of Yugoslavia,
these problems were partially addressed by the stopgap expedient of
conditioning recognition on compliance with a draft Convention then
under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia. 7" The other
general requirements propounded by the EC related more closely to
traditional interests of other states, although serious questions existed
as to how even these requirements could be implemented. These
requirements included respect for inviolability of frontiers and for the
principle that frontiers can be changed only by peaceful means and on
the basis of free agreement; respect for relevant commitments concern-
ing disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, security, and regional sta-
bility; and commitment to settle regional disputes and questions about
state succession by agreement or, if necessary, by arbitration.74
The opinions issued by the Arbitration Commission on November
29, 1991 and January 11, 1992, are an interesting blend of traditional
and innovative international law. They are propositions that would not
be generally accepted by international lawyers but clearly appealed to
constitutional law judges seeking to address unusual and difficult situa-
tions. 75 The Commission declared on November 29, 1991, that the
existence of a federal state, combining entities endowed with a degree of
autonomy and with political power in relation to the federal institutions,
implied that the Federal organs must represent the component units
and must be effective; that, four of the six republics having made decla-
rations of independence or sovereignty, the essential organs of the Fed-
eration no longer satisfied the requirements of participation and
representativity; and that Yugoslavia ought thus to be regarded as a fed-
eration in the process of disintegration, rather than as a rump state from
which certain units had seceded. Thus the rump state would not auto-
matically succeed to the rights of Yugoslavia; questions of succession
would have to be agreed upon by the Republics themselves, in conform-
ity with international law. This view is broadly tenable under estab-
lished international law, although some questions arise as to whether it
is consistent with the treatment of state succession in relation to the for-
mer USSR.
73. This draft was not transformed into an agreed treaty in the November 1991
negotiations, primarily because the adherence of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade
could not be obtained. It continued to be discussed as a possible basis for future
arrangements in the new phase of the peace process inaugurated in August 1992 by
the enlarged London conference.
74. Additional undertakings not to make territorial claims or engage in propa-
ganda against a member of the Community were included to assuage Greek concerns
about Macedonia.
75. Opinions 1, 2 and 3 have been published in 92 REVUE GgNiRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 264-69 (1992). The comments which follow are based on the
original French texts of the Commission's opinions; official English translations were
not available to the author at the time of writing.
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The Commission also emphasized principles of order in response to
a question, raised by Serbia, as to whether the internal boundaries
between Serbia and Croatia, and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were
to be regarded as frontiers in international law. 76 The Commission
stated that the external borders of Yugoslavia must be respected; that
the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia could only be modified by free
agreement; that in the absence of such agreement the internal bounda-
ries would take on the character of frontiers protected by international
law by virtue of the general international legal principle of uti possidetis
juris; and that any purported modification of external frontiers or inter-
nal boundaries effected by force would have no juridical effects. The
last of these propositions was supported by reference to the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, the Helsinki
Final Act, and the draft Convention on Yugoslavia. Although the princi-
ple as to borders between independent states is well established,7 7 it is
interesting that none of the texts cited by the Commission is directly
binding, and indeed the Commission's position as to modification of
internal boundaries, an activity not infrequently attempted by various
colonial powers, is not fully consistent with practice.
As to self-determination and minority rights, the Commission found
more difficulty in simply basing itself on established international law.
Serbia had posed the question whether the ethnic Serbs of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina had the right to self-determination. The Commis-
sion asserted that the principle of uti possidetisjuris trumped irredentist
claims based on the right to self-determination, holding that borders
existing at the moment of independence were not subject to alteration
to satisfy the requirements of self-determination except where the states
involved so agreed. The Commission further held that in the present
state of international law, not all the consequences of the right to self-
determination are specified. The Commission pointedly refrained from
saying that the ethnic Serbs in the two other Republics did not have the
right to self-determination. Indeed, the Commission stated that Article
I of the 1966 Covenants established that the right to self-determination
was a principle protecting human rights, and that by virtue of this right
each human being could properly claim to belong to the ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic community of her or his choice.7 8 The Commission
drew from the principle of self-determination the operational conse-
76. Opinion No. 3, January 11, 1992.
77. This was reaffirmed by the Security Council following Iraq's purported
annexation of Kuwait. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR Res. 661 (1990).
78. The assertion that Article I establishes an operational right to self-determina-
tion for individuals seems to be inconsistent with assumptions made by the UN
Human Rights Committee in its case law denying that individuals are ever entitled to
bring Optional Protocol claims in respect of Article 1. See Commmunication No.
167/1984 Ominayak v. Canada (Final Views of March 26, 1990), discussed above;
Communication No. 413/1990 A.B. et al. v. Italy (inadmissibility decision of Novem-
ber 2, 1990); Communication No. 358/1989 R.L. et al. v. Canada (inadmissibility
decision of 5 November 1991); and Communication No. 205/1986 Mikmaq Tribal
Society v. Canada (Final Views published December 3, 1991).
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quence that, if the Republics so agreed, members of the Serbian com-
munities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia could have the nationality
of their choice, with all the rights and obligations following from that.
Although the Commission is not explicit, it is presumed that choice of
Serbian nationality would not entail loss of the right of residence in
whichever state the individual lived. The Commission further found
that imperative norms of international law (i.e., jus cogens) oblige states
to ensure respect for minorities' rights. The Commission applied these
obligations to the Republics in respect of all minorities within their terri-
tories. The Republics had to recognize the identity of ethnic, linguistic
or religious communities. Beyond this, however, the Commission did
not state what other rights international law conferred upon minorities,
although it referred in general terms to international treaties in force,
and to chapter II of the draft Convention on Yugoslavia of November 4,
1991. 79 The Commission, however, in its unpublished Opinions con-
cerning application for recognition by particular Republics, had neces-
sarily to consider in detail the adequacy of particular legal provisions
concerning use of minority languages, education, political representa-
tion or authority of minority communities, etc.8 0
V. Implications for the Development of International Law
Earlier sections pointed to the urgent need for development of more
general international law principles, rules and structures suitable for
dealing effectively with claims by non-state groups. The inability-or
the failure-of the international community to develop sufficiently com-
prehensive and effective normative and procedural provisions for
addressing claims by non-state groups has resulted in ad hoc attempts to
develop these provisions in response to recent crises. These ad hoc pro-
visions have come too late to effectively shape behavior, and they have
lacked the legitimacy necessary to avoid or mitigate conflict. The lack of
a generalized normative and procedural framework has also reinforced
inevitable tendencies of major states to react in different ways to dif-
ferent claims, not for principled universal reasons but for particularist
reasons reflecting the special interests of major states and
decisionmakers. 8 l
79. Opinion No. 3, supra note 75.
80. Thus it is understood that in its unpublished Opinion concerning the request
for recognition by Macedonia, the Commission noted in some detail provisions of the
new Macedonian Constitution concerning rights of minorities to identity, cultural
expression, establishment of private schools, education in their own language, etc. It
is understood that the Commission took the view that education for members of
minorities should also be provided in the Macedonian language, and that more
detailed laws are needed to make these various constitutional guarantees operational.
Somewhat similar material is understood to be contained in the unpublished Opinion
concerning the request for recognition by Slovenia.
81. The fragmentary response of the major actors in the international community
to events in Somalia in 1991-92, and the difference in promptitude (and at least ini-
tially in scale) between these attempts and the contemporaneous undertakings in
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There are many explanations for the inadequate development of
the norms of international law with respect to claims by non-state
groups. In some respects this underdevelopment was deliberate; thus
anxiety about the potentially harmful implications for state interests-
and for individual rights-of conferring rights on non-state groups was a
constant factor for most of the period from 1945 until about 1990. Nor-
mative development has also been impeded by well-known political
obstacles, especially East-West and West-South divisions, associated
with the structure of the post-1945 legal order. The absence of a focus
on non-state groups was also an incidental byproduct of the preoccupa-
tion since 1945 with the development of norms and institutions for the
protection of individual human rights, and with developing legal struc-
tures to facilitate specific and foreseen developments such as
decolonization.
The political climate for normative development has become some-
what more propitious, although major differences continue. Perhaps
equally important are the gradual changes in the structure of interna-
tional order, including changes in the nature of state sovereignty. The
changes in the nature of sovereignty are complex and uneven, but have
been influenced by the proliferation of transnational non-state interac-
tions; the transmission of ideas about such things as governance, mar-
kets, human rights, information, and environment; and increasing
international accountability. The heightened level of self-assertion
among national and other groups, and the increased willingness of the
international community to consider some accommodation of the claims
pressed by such groups, is sharpening the international focus on the
nature of the state and of state sovereignty. An important report, issued
by the United Nations Secretary-General in June 1992 and entitled "An
Agenda For Peace," is evidence of changing views on state sovereignty,
even within an inter-state organization. The Report examines the press-
ing need to enhance preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
rebuilding peace after civil and international war, and amelioration of
economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression, but adds:
The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect
for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common
international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty,
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the
task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance
between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of
an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, communications and
environmental matters transcend administrative borders; but inside these
borders is where individuals carry out the first order of their economic,
political and social lives. 82
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, illustrates this point. There were, without doubt,
serious obstacles to effective action in each case.
82. At 5, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992).
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A major obstacle to further normative development is that posed by
the real problems in formulating and agreeing upon norms of general
application with sufficient specificity, and with the necessary hierarchical
ordering and coherence, to be useful at the operational level. The uni-
versal substantive normative formulations in the field of self-determina-
tion are very broad and have in practice been hedged with exceptions
and limitations. Furthermore, they are part of the same legal system as
other potentially conflicting general normative propositions of appar-
ently equal value. It has proved difficult to secure the level of agreement
and acceptance necessary to adopt sweeping substantive prescriptions
dealing specifically with minority rights. Detailed and workable norms
of general application have been adopted in the field of human rights,8 3
and this area may provide the best starting point for a substantive effort
to unify the three general domains of discourse by reference to the
underlying justificatory purposes of each. The ICCPR indeed, despite
its limitations, provides a modest textual basis for such an enterprise, in
that it does not itself formally separate the three general domains of
discourse. It recognizes that self-determination is indispensable to the
realization of other human rights, and interpreted literally it treats
minority rights as essentially the same as human rights. In practice,
however, the domains have been divided. Self-determination has been
permitted to operate largely in a separate plane, and the efforts of the
international community to relate self-determination to protection of
minorities and human rights have been patchy and enjoyed only modest
practical success. The powerful discourse of individual human rights
has not been extended with sufficient sensitivity to particular problems
relating to non-state groups. The regime of minority rights has been
severely limited, in part because inadequate normative development in
the three domains left room for anxiety that it might impair individual
rights on the one hand, or shade threateningly into overdrawn self-
determination claims on the other.
Agreement is more easily secured on procedural rules. With
respect to claims by non-state groups, however, procedural rules are not
as well developed. Some of the procedural limitations are a result of the
historically inter-state character of the international legal system. More
effective procedural norms are beginning to appear, due to both the
changing nature of the state and the increasing transnationalization of
the international legal system. Nevertheless, with the monumental
exception of decolonization, international bodies remain cautious when
handling major claims by non-state groups. One reason for caution is
the tendency of these bodies to maintain a universalist view of their
practice, and thus to avoid setting workable precedents in one context
which might, from their viewpoint, have disastrous political ramifica-
83. There continue to be important challenges to the validity of fundamental
human rights norms, including challenges to the norms of equality and non-discrimi-
nation; the major general challenge, that posed by the international law principle of
non-interference in domestic affairs, has gradually been eclipsed.
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tions in another context. 84 The most ambitious practice is often particu-
larist, frequently undertaken in ways designed to minimize precedential
implications. The response of various countries to the claims and inter-
ests of Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991 is one illustration.85
The concentration on process, and the substantive neutrality of
what Franck describes as the secular international rule community,8 6 has
important implications. It suggests that as a practical matter all eligible
claims must be regarded as equally worthy. This is a politically impossi-
ble and morally uneasy position. A common response of international
bodies has been to sidestep the problem by remaining circumspect. The
normative response has been to try to restrict eligibility by narrow cir-
cumscription of the categories of rightholders. As this article has
pointed out, however, definition of rightholders is only one aspect of the
analysis of self-determination, minority rights, and equality provisions.
The further questions of the meaning of the right, the justification of the
right, and the consequences of the right, are at least as important.
Even if it is possible to articulate worthwhile general norms and to
devise effective systems of international supervision, what is the proper
role of the international community in relation to claims by non-state
groups? Liberal internationalism tends to assume a moral obligation on
the part of the international community to become involved, at least
where basic rights are threatened or justice claims are denied.8 7 For-
eign states and decisionmakers have generally been more circumspect,
supporting significant involvement only where international security or
other external interests are directly jeopardized, or in some extreme
humanitarian emergencies, especially where domestic political circum-
stances are favorable to involvement. In the wake of the question, "who
ought to act?" comes the question, "who ought to pay?" Public interna-
tional law has been concerned with these questions mainly with regard
to international organizations. More fundamentally, however, they are
moral and political questions. There is a continuing tension between
the universalism of liberal ethics, in which proximity and connection are
irrelevant to moral worth, and the ordinary human instinct to attach
84. This explains the frustration exemplified in Turpel's conclusion that in terms
both of norms and supervisory or political pressure "the United Nations and the
Human Rights Committee have been of virtually no assistance in indigenous strug-
gles [in Canada]." Turpel, supra note 46, at 602.
85. Note also, for example, the express provision in the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Doc-
ument whereby the participating States reaffirm "the need to develop appropriate
programmes addressing problems of their respective nationals belonging to Roma
and other groups traditionally identified as Gypsies and to create conditions for them
to have equal opportunities to participate fully in the life of the society." The Chat-
lenges of Change, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Decisions, Chapter VI,
para. 35 (on file with author).
86. FRANCK, supra note 8.
87. This does not mean, of course, that international involvement will always be
adverse to the target state. The purposes served by rights are thwarted, and justice
effectively denied, by non-state groups, by states, and by conflict for which responsi-
bility is mixed or unattributable.
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greater importance to family, to community, and to what one is intimate
or at least familiar with. Indeed, one of the ethical arguments for
nationalism is precisely that it is instrumental in realizing these particu-
larist individual goods.8 8
Would the existence of comprehensive and precise international
normative provisions and supervisory machinery have made any differ-
ence to events in Yugoslavia, or Somalia, or anywhere else? Certainly
the factors which caused states and other actors to be unwilling to
engage in norm-creating and institution-building endeavors would also
have militated against the effectiveness of any such norms or institu-
tions, and little is to be gained from a counterfactual exercise in which
normative and institutional issues are isolated from the political and ide-
ological background. For present purposes it is more useful to address
the further skeptical claim that even if developed in the future, interna-
tional legal provisions and machinery are still unlikely to be effective.
This claim fits poorly with the vigorous efforts of states and other inter-
national actors to develop such provisions and machinery with
uncharacteristic speed. While a skeptic may discern traces of delusion,
illusion, or even hypocrisy, the rapid innovations in the CSCE, for exam-
ple, seem to manifest a strong belief that the normative provisions mat-
ter, although the provisions are formally political rather than "legal,"
and that the institutional mechanisms will work.8 9 More generally, ref-
erence may be made to studies of the effectiveness of various legal and
other regimes.90 While these studies provide some grounds for opti-
mism about the potential effectiveness of international norms and insti-
tutions, few of them address human rights regimes, and fewer still
address regimes dealing with claims by non-state groups. 9 1 Problems of
methodology, perspective, and data collection in these areas are formi-
88. See David Miller, The Ethical Significance of Nationality, 98 ETHICS 647 (1988);
and Brian Barry, Self-Government Revisited, in THE NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY 121-
54 (David Miller and Larry Siedentop eds., 1983).
89. Formal records as to the use of the various CSCE Mechanisms have not gen-
erally been kept hitherto. Unofficial records compiled by the Netherlands Helsinki
Committee show that between adoption of the Vienna Mechanism in 1989 and Octo-
ber 1990 the first phase of that Mechanism was invoked 103 times (7 against western
states, 4 against neutral and non-aligned states, and 92 against eastern European
states). The other three phases were also used on several occasions. See Arie Bloed
& Pieter van Dijk, Supervisory Mechanism for the Human Dimension of the CSCE, in THE
HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS 73, 79 (Arie Bloed & Pieter van Dijk
eds., 1991).
90. A few of many examples of such studies are jack Donnelly, International Human
Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOI NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1989); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES IN EAST-WEST POLITICS (Volker Rittberger ed.
1990); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in Inter-
national Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479 (1990); Martin List & Volker Rittberger, Regime
Theory and International Environmental Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 85-109 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
91. Studies have been undertaken of the relative success of the international legal
and institutional regime for dealing with decolonization, and of international contri-
butions to transitions to democracy.
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dable. Experience in other issue areas suggests that future regimes for
relations between state and non-state groups might be workable, effec-
tive, and preferable to the alternatives. The importance of further work
in this area has been widely recognized; the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has appointed
a Special Rapporteur on "possible ways and means of facilitating the
peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities,"'9 2
and the CSCE has resolved to convene a seminar in 1993 on "Case
Studies of National Minorities Issues: Positive Results."
Established international law principles, doctrines, and institutions
for supervision and implementation may contribute significantly to the
adjustment of relations between states and non-state groups. Even
when the best possible interpretation is given to existing legal materials,
however, it is clear that further normative and institutional development
is urgently needed if adequate frameworks are to be established. It is
also clear that part of the normative development involves more sophis-
ticated reconciliation of the existing domains of discourse. The ade-
quacy and effectiveness of such frameworks depends in part on their
legitimacy, which itself has an impact on the willingness of those with
the necessary power to apply or ignore them. In so far as legitimacy is
the compliance-pull felt by established states or entities emerging in
accordance with well-established legal standards, legitimacy is likely to
attach to principles of order, including principles for managed transition
where necessary. In so far as legitimacy is influenced by the perceptions
of non-state groups with revisionist demands, it will depend both on the
actual efficacy of the rules and on the extent to which they are consistent
with claims of substantive and procedural justice. Given existing distri-
butions of power, and the instrumental value of stability, considerations
of order are likely to remain central to the international normative
structure.
92. The Special Rapporteur is Mr. Asbjorn Eide. For his preliminary report, see
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/43 (1991).

